This monograph attempts to clarify one significant but much neglected aspect of Peirce's contribution to the philosophy of science. It was written in 1963 as my M. A. thesis at the Uni versity of Illinois. Since the topic is still neglected it is hoped that its pUblication will be of use to Peirce scholars. I should like to acknowledge my indebtedness to Dr. Max Fisch who broached this topic to me and who advised me con tinuously through its development, assisting (...) generously with his own insights and unpublished Peirce manuscripts. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1. A Current Issue in the Philosophy of Science 1 2. Peirce and His Theory of Abduction 5 3. The General Character of Abduction 7 PART I: THE EARLY THEORY 1. Peirce's Earliest Conception of Inference 11 2. Three Kinds of Inference and Three Figures of Syllogism 13 3. Ampliative Inference and Cognition 17 4. Induction and Hypothesis 20 5. The Method of Methods 23 PART II: THE LATER THEORY 1. The Transitional Period 28 2. Three Stages of Inquiry 31 3. Abduction and Guessing Instinct 35 4. Logic as a Normative Science 38 5. Hypothesis Construction and Selection 41 6. Abduction and Pragmatism 44 7. Economy of Research 47 8. Justification of Abduction 51 CONCLUSION 55 61 BIBLIOGRAPHY INTRODUCTION 1. (shrink)

Meiotic recombination occurs preferentially at certain regions called hot spots and is important for generating genetic diversity and proper segregation of chromosomes during meiosis. Hot spots have been characterized most extensively in yeast, mice and humans. The development of methods based on sperm typing and population genetics has facilitated rapid and high‐resolution mapping of hot spots in mice and humans in recent years. With increasing information becoming available on meiotic recombination in different species, it is now possible to compare several (...) molecular features associated with hot‐spot loci. Further, there have been advances in our knowledge of the factors influencing hot‐spot activity and the role that they play in structuring the genome into haplotype blocks. We review the molecular features associated with hot spots in terms of their properties and mechanisms underlying their function and distribution. A large number of these features seem to be shared among hot spots from different species suggesting common mechanisms for their formation and function. BioEssays 28:45–56, 2006. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Despite the title, some of the essays are devoted to matters which are not strictly epistemological. Both Malcolm and Stoutland are concerned with accounting for the connection between intention and the object of intention. Malcolm reviews Wittgenstein's thoughts on the subject while Stoutland gives an account of intentions in terms of teleology. With an eye toward the free will and skepticism controversies, White attempts an account of "What Might Have Been," distinguishing between existential and problematic possibilities. The remaining essays delve (...) into the topics of traditional epistemology. Oliver gives "A Sober Look at Solipsism" focussing attention on its 'causal' and 'privacy' postulates. Taking up the challenge of skepticism, Unger argues that "Our Knowledge of the Material World" not only is a reality, but is a function of our immediate experience. We can't help but believe such experiences, just as dogs must. The attempt is made by Pollock to map out "The Structure of Epistemic Justification" and he eschews a deductive model of explanation in favor of showing that logical reasons are but one kind of good reason--good reasons being the stuff of justification. Knox argues that "Do Appearances Exist?" deserves an affirmative answer as a consequence of the fact that we perceive objects, given his treatment of appearances as events. This is an interesting collection of essays, albeit for the non-subscriber, an expensive one.--K. T. (shrink)

There is a unique relationship between Maoist policies and philosophy. This uniqueness is idue, on the one hand, to the pedagogical orientation of the CPC, and to the essential role of the cultural revolution, on the other.

JL Austin exercised in Post-war Oxford an intellectual authority similar to that of Wittgenstein in Cambridge. Although he completed no books of his own and published only seven papers, Austin became through lectures and talks one of the acknowledged leaders in what is called ‘Oxford philosophy’ or ‘ordinary language philosophy’. Few would dispute that among analytic philosophers Austin stands out as a great and original philosophical genius. Three volumes of his writing, published after his death, have become classics in analytical (...) philosophy: _Philosophical Papers_; _Sense and Sensibilia_; and _How to Do Things with Words_. First published in 1979, this book is a collection of critical essays on Austin’s philosophy written by well-known philosophers, many of whom knew Austin personally. A number of essays included were especially written for this volume, but the majority have appeared previously in various journals or books, not all easy to obtain. (shrink)

Graphical AbstractGroup photo of the participants at the chromosome stability meeting in Jawaharlal Nehru Centre for Advanced Scientific Research (JNCASR), Bangalore, India. The meeting brought together the Indian scientific community and investigators from other countries working on various aspects of chromosome stability.

The double issue of Synthese devoted to essays on the work of W. V. Quine has been re-issued under hard cover with an additional paper by Grice on "Vacuous Names" and a 13-page bibliography of Quine's writings. With the exception of Berry's "Logic with Platonism" and Jensen's "On The Consistency of a Slight. Modification of Quine's New Foundation," the papers are concerned with the key issues of Word and Object. Quine's responses to each of the contributors are not as helpful (...) as they might be, but are at times quite illuminating. He dispels Stenius's view in "Beginning with Ordinary Things" that Quine holds a Russellian epistemology, for example, and clarifies somewhat his account of ontic commitment in replying to Hintikka's "Behavioral Criteria of Radical Translation." Hintikka argues that "to be is to be a value of a bound variable" presupposes the principle, "to be is to be an object of search." Quine rejects this view, identifying his ontology with the range of the variables as opposed to the class of all things to which a theory is ontically committed. The introduction to chapter two of Word and Object by Harman is quite helpful, suggesting among other things that Quine's use of 'propositional attitude' is a misnomer to be better replaced by 'sentential attitude'. An interesting and provocative paper by Kaplan offers a Fregean alternative to Quine's general mode of handling referentially opaque contexts, allowing "Quantifying In" with the variable ranging over expressions. Interestingly enough, Quine's remarks are rather laudatory and sympathetic. Davidson's "On Saying That" suggests a roughly similar account of oratio obliqua discourse. Føllesdal and Sellars discuss "Quine on Modality" and "Some Problems about Belief." There is a discussion of "Quine's Philosophy of Science" by Smart, tracing a shift from instrumentalism to realism on the part of Quine. Also included are papers by Chomsky, Stroud, and Geach, as well as Strawson's familiar "Singular Terms and Predication." In spite of the imposing price and the uneven quality of the essays, the book is a desirable piece of Quineana.--K. T. (shrink)

Prior apparently left a substantially completed manuscript dealing with the objects of thought when he died in 1969. Geach and Kenny have edited this material, supplementing it with both published and unpublished other writings, including an appendix on names in lieu of Prior's intended final chapter. The result is an interesting, often non-standard, discussion of many issues central to philosophical logic. There are two major concerns treated--what is it that we think?, and what is it that we think about?. These (...) are the two principle ways in which 'thinking of' can occur as a relation for Prior. An examination of the first sense results in a defense of the view that propositions, as language-independent logical constructions, are the objects of thought. In doing so, a large number of related issues are discussed to include criticisms of extentionalist [[sic]] theses, a sympathetic version of the assertive redundancy theory of truth, and an account of non-assertoric logic. Prior also devotes chapters to paradoxes such as that of the liar, and to Tarskian and alternative semantics. Perhaps the most interesting section of the book is that devoted to discussing what sentences are about, especially when their ostensible subjects are non-existent, e.g., "The King of France is bald." It is not clear just what his positive views are, but Prior has a number of criticisms directed against current intentionalistic views of names as well as against Russellian names. His chief worry seems to concern oratio obliqua constructions in which a reporter does not believe in the existence of that of which/whom a reportee speaks. Although critical of writers influenced by either the early Brentano or the later Russell, Prior appears to be sympathetic to both schools in that he seems to view non-demonstrative sentences as never being directly about their subjects. Thus, neither "Gustavus is bald" nor "The King of Sweden is bald" would be about the King of Sweden, i.e., Gustavus. However, since Gustavus is the King of Sweden, the sentences are indirectly about him. Presumably, such a move precludes a reporter's being committed to the reportee's ontology, thereby avoiding the difficulty. An interesting but undeveloped aspect of his view is the role of background stories in our use of names. While some use is made of formal logic in the Polish notation, unfamiliarity with either is not a bar to following the text as English translations and keys are provided. It is unfortunate that we cannot look forward to further elucidation of Prior's views.--K. T. (shrink)

On April 3, 1995, the Fourth Circuit upheld the right of a Maryland hospital to terminate a surgeon who was HIV-positive ). A resident in the University of Maryland Neurosurgical Training Program was dismissed when hospital administrators learned of his infection with HIV. The resident, known as Dr. Doe, claimed that his termination violated federal laws protecting persons with disabilities. The court upheld the hospital's actions as lawful and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the hospital.Dr. Doe (...) charged that his dismissal from the training program violated the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. (shrink)